Value-Added Trade and Regionalization. GTAP Eleventh Annual Conference 'Future of Global Economy', Helsinki, Finland by Daudin, Guillaume et al.
 1
VALUE-ADDED TRADE AND REGIONALIZATION 
Guillaume Daudin, Christine Rifflart, Danielle Schweisguth 
OFCE, Sciences Po Paris 
This version: May 7th, 2008 
 
Preliminary version: please do not quote 
 
 
For nearly two decades, growth of international trade has been underpinned by the 
development of intermediate goods cross exchanges resulting from a new international 
division of labour. The share of trade in inputs, also called vertical trade, has dramatically 
increased. Simultaneously, there has been some fear of excessive regionalization in trade. 
In this situation, the traditional trade measures based on the values of goods crossing 
borders are inappropriate to measure how self-centred are different regions. This paper 
suggests a new measure of international trade: “value-added trade”. Compared to “standard” 
trade, “value-added trade” is net of double-counted vertical trade and reallocates trade flows 
to input-producing industries. A database of value-added trade is made using the GTAP trade 
and input-output database for 66 regions (mostly countries) and 55 sectors in 1997 and 2001. 
In 2001, 26% of international trade were "only" vertical specialization trade, up from 
25% in 1997. The share of services in value-added trade is much more important than in 
standard trade. East Asia still relies more heavily on extra-regional final markets than North 
America or Europe. 
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Introduction 
The recent development of regional trade agreements has sparked the fear of the 
emergence of antagonist regional trade blocs.1 It is not actually clear that the spaghetti bowl 
of regional trade agreements really can have this kind of effects by itself.2 Yet, it is clear that 
East Asia has recently experienced a growing regionalization of its trade.3 It could be possible 
that its development is becoming more self-centred. 
Yet, cross-border production networking, encouraged by extensive FDI flows has been an 
important part of this growing regionalization. In this context, international trade statistics fail 
to offer a good picture of trade integration and global division of labour because they cannot 
answer the question “who produces for whom?”. Let us take an example. Burberry sends 
bottles of French perfume to Shanghai to be decorated with Scottish pattern before bringing 
them back to be sold on the French market. Yet, no one should conclude that France is 
importing perfumes from China and is dependant for part of its cosmetic consumption on 
China.4 Yet, that is what international trade statistics suggest. It would be more useful to 
restrict the measure of trade to goods and services intended for consumption. In our example, 
France does not export anything for Chinese consumption, as perfumes are consumed in 
France. China, for its part, only exports decoration to France. In some cases, that requires 
tracking goods through long supply chains. Suppose the pigments used for the decoration of 
these perfume bottles are imported to China from Japan. While trade statistics will indicate 
that they are imported from Japan to China, one would be wrong to believe that this pigment 
                                                
1 World Bank (2000). 
2 Baldwin (2006),Ethier (1998) 
3 Kwan (2001), Chortareas and Pelagidis (2004). 
4 Examples from Benhamou (2005), p. 19, 25 and 96. 
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trade has no bearing on the shape of the Franco-Japanese economic integration. Unravelling 
these long supply chains is impossible using simply trade statistics. 
This paper advocates the study of regionalization using “value-added trade”. Compared 
to “standard” trade, “value-added trade” is net of double-counted vertical specialization trade5 
and reallocates trade flows to the input-producing industries. This alternative measure of trade 
is all the more important since internationalisation of production plays a great role in the 
recent increase of international trade. Rising vertical specialization reinforces the divergence 
between value-added trade flows and standard trade statistics. There is a large literature on 
measuring vertical trade. Two broad methods have been employed. The first method measures 
vertical trade by looking at the fine composition of trade to isolate trade flows of parts and 
components.6 This is useful and allows the examination of very fine-grained data, but cannot 
be extended to measure value-added trade. Another method uses both input/output data and 
trade data to measure the share of imports embedded in exports7. Our paper relies on this 
literature and extends it by suggesting a method not only to measure the share of vertical 
specialization trade in each country and industry’s trade, but also to reconstruct value-added 
bilateral trade by industry for 66 regions. However, we are only able to do the computation 
for two years: 1997 and 2001.  
The difficulty of the measuring value-added trade lies in taking into account all the stages 
of production of a final good in every country and every sector in order to track all the value-
added contributions coming into its production. First, second, third… stage inputs must be 
isolated. This can only be done thanks to a coherent worldwide set of intermediate delivery 
matrices and bilateral trade matrices. The GTAP database has been built to run general 
5 Vertical trade sometimes designates intra-industry trade in goods of different qualities. This is not the object of 
this paper. 
6 Ng and Yeats (2003), Egger and Egger (2005), Athukorala and Yamashita (2006). 
7 Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001); Yi (2003); 
Chen, Kondratowicz, and Yi (2005).  
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equilibrium analysis of the effects of international trade. It includes the necessary 
information.8 
This paper presents a method to compute value-added international trade and re-examine 
the issue of regionalization. In a first section, the paper presents vertical specialization trade, 
and its existing measures. In a second section, it presents a method to compute value-added 
trade. In a third section, it presents some results for 1997 and 2001 and compares them to 
results obtained by other methods. It then compare the regionalization of Asian trade with 
regionalization in other parts of the world. This paper builds on an earlier application focused 
on France using a more aggregated database.9 
1. Vertical specialization trade 
The “second trade globalization” that started after WWII has clearly accelerated during 
the last two decades (graph 1). Measured in constant prices, the share of goods and services 
exports in world GDP has doubled from 1985 to 2005, whereas it grew only by 2 percent 
from 1970 to 1985. Today, exports in goods and services are equal to 30 percents of the world 
GDP. However, because of the prevalence of vertical trade, this does not mean that 
30 percents of the world GDP are produced for consumption in other countries… 
                                                
8 Dimaranan (2006). 
9 Daudin, Rifflart, Schweisguth, and Veroni (2006). 
Figure 1: the expansion of world trade 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
 World exports as a share of world GDP (in volume)
                                                
Source: CEPII (2007)  
1.1. What is it? 
There is vertical specialization of trade as soon as:10  
- the production of a good follows a sequential process that can be broken down in 
several stages;  
- at least two countries take part in this production process;  
- at least one country imports inputs to produce the goods of which a fraction of the 
production is exported. 
Based on that definition, two different measures of trade can be identified. The first one, 
which we call “standard trade”, measures trade flows based on their market value when they 
cross borders, integrating all intermediate goods coming in the production of the good. When 
exported goods contain a high proportion of imported inputs, their market value can be very 
high compared to locally produced value added. This measure can lead to a very high export 
to GDP ratio, sometimes exceeding 100% (as in the case of Malaysia and Singapore). The 
other measure, called “value-added trade”, measures trade net of vertical trade. It reallocates 
10 Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998). 
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the value added produced at the different stages of the production process to each of the 
participating countries and industry. 
Vertical specialization introduces complementarities between countries, each one taking 
part in the development of the end product at a specific stage of the process. A country A 
produces a good i which will be exported towards B as intermediate input necessary to the 
production of a good j, which will be in turn exported towards a country C. At the end of the 
process, the product is sold as a final good for consumption or investment. “Standard” trade 
tracks all these exchanges. But trade in inputs is “only” vertical specialization trade. Value-
added trade corrects for that and measures only the trade flows between the producer and the 
final user. 
Let us take the example of three countries A, B and C (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Three ways to look at the same trade flows 
 
The left side of the figure shows total trade flows as they appear in standard trade 
statistics (for shorthand “standard trade”). The top right figure shows vertical trade. “Cars 
without windshields” are counted twice in standard trade statistics: once when they are 
exported to become inputs to B’s production and once when they are embedded into B’s 
exports. The bottom right figure shows “value added” trade. This is obtained through three 
operations: first by removing vertical trade flows from standard trade flows; second by re-
allocating vertical trade flows to the producer / consumer country pair; third by allocating 
trade flows to the industries that actually produce the value-added. 
Value-added trade flows imply that country A does not actually trade with country B in 
the sense that no final user in country B utilizes goods from country A. All the final users of 
country A’s exports are in country C. Similarly, the industrial picture of trade is changed. 
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Standard trade flows suggest that country A does not export services. Yet, its service 
production is being consumed, once it is embedded in cars, in country C. In that sense, 
country A is actually exporting services. 
Value-added trade flows can change our assessment of regionalization. Imagine that 
country A and country B are in the same region. Standard trade flows suggest that intra-
regional trade flows are nearly as important as extra-regional trade flows. Yet, value-added 
trade flows suggest that intra-regional trade flows are nil in the sense that no one in country A 
or B is consuming goods produced in another country in the same region. Both countries are 
producing for country C’s consumption. This is a very different case of regionalization than 
one in which country B actually depends on country A for its final consumption. Applied to 
the study of Asian trade, the examination of value-added trade confirms and refines the result 
that despite its apparent regionalization, Asia’s trade is still very dependent on external 
consumption.11 
1.2. Why vertical specialization? 
The Fordist organization of production put in place at the end of the World War II at a 
national scale has been transformed into a disintegrated process, where stages of production 
are spread across a range of production sites in multiple countries. This vertical specialisation 
of production is based on a new international division of labour moving away from the 
traditional division where production is split up between primary and manufactured goods. 
Segmentation of production is becoming increasingly subtle, maybe in order to make the most 
of the comparative advantages of each country. The segmentation of production processes has 
led to foreign outsourcing of some production activities. 
11 Athukorala and Yamashita (2006). 
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This new international division of labour has logically induced the acceleration of trade 
flows since the end of the 1980s as a growing number of inputs are crossing several borders. 
This finally results in a rapid expansion of trade in inputs, some of which are intermediate 
goods. The multiplication of input trade has been facilitated by the cut in tariff and nontariff 
barriers following the rise of economic liberalism and the multiplication of bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements concluded within the framework of the GATT and the WTO. 
This had a larger effect on vertical specialization trade than on the other types of trade as the 
internationalisation of the production process implies an increase in the number of borders 
crossed by each goods.12 
Micro-economic explanations of this movement give a by analysing the role of 
multinational entreprises (MNE) in trade of intermediate goods. They have been inspired by 
the new international trade theories integrating new findings in firm theory.13 The stock of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) worldwide accounts for a quarter of world GDP today against 
6-7% in the 1980s.14 This growing FDI led to the expansion of multinational firm networks. 
Empirical evidence suggest that multinational firms have a leading role in the rise of vertical 
specialization trade, even if the actual link between vertical specialization trade flows and FDI 
is closely dependent on the inner strategy of each firm. 
On this subject, Kleinert underlines there is a strong correlation between MNE production 
in a host country and the propensity of this country to import intermediate goods. However, 
the links between MNE production and the sale of inputs from the host country to the original 
country is less clear.15 Hanson et alii show that American firms practising outsourcing import 
more intermediate goods if their subsidiary companies operate in countries where commercial 
12 Yi (2003). 
13 Jones (2000) ; Grossman and Helpman (2005), Ravix and Sautel (2007). 
14 UNCTAD (2005). 
15 Kleinert (2003). 
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costs, wages, and companies’ taxation are weak.16 Bardhan and Jaffee provide contrasting 
results, as they report that in the case of the United States, arm-length transactions dominate 
input trade flows even if network trade remains substantial.17 
On the macro side, and to come back to the issue of regionalization, an already rich 
literature details the reasons behind the high intensity of vertical trade in regional trade in East 
Asia.18 The first reason is a more favourable policy setting for international production (for 
example China applied a lower tax rate on profits made by foreign companies to attract FDI). 
Second, Asian countries are experiencing the benefits arising from the early entry into this 
from of specialisation, which started in the 80s when Japan started to delocalise the assembly 
stage in Korea, Taiwan or Singapore. Third, inter-country wage differentials have always 
been very high in Asia. When some countries develop faster and labour cost increases, 
production is moved to poorer countries in order to optimise the production cost. Fourth, trade 
and transport costs are relatively low within the region. And fifth, the region has specialised 
in products with increasing return to scale, taking advantage of the abundant labour force 
available. 
1.3. How can it be measured? 
Whatever the causes of vertical trade, it can be measured in two ways: either using very 
fine industrial classification or using input-output tables. 
In the context of the SITC, Rev 3, the first method is possible for the goods belonging to 
categories 7 (machinery and transport equipment) and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured 
articles), in the five-digit SITC classification. It has been conducted by Athukorala and 
Yamashita for most countries in the world. They find that world trade in components 
16 Hanson, Mataloni Jr, and Slaughter (2005). 
17 Bardhan and Jaffee (2005). 
18 See the review in Haddad (2007). 
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increased from 18.5 percent to 22 percent of world manufacturing exports from 1992 and 
2003.19 
Yi and alii use the second method, as does this paper. They calculated international 
vertical specialisation trade, defined as the share of imported inputs in exports, using input-
output matrices of 10 OCDE countries and a few emerging market economies (Ireland, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Mexico) 20. In their computation, Yi and alii take into account imported 
goods directly used as inputs for the production of exports, but also imported inputs used for 
the production of domestic inputs used in the production of exports: they call all these flows 
“VS” for vertical specialization trade.  
But the definition of vertical trade is wider than VS. Purely domestic-produced exports 
can also be part of vertical specialization trade if they are subsequently used by another 
country as inputs to its export goods: the authors call this flow “VS1”. While VS measures 
vertical specialization of a country from its use of imported inputs in its exports, VS1 
measures it from the use of a country’s exported goods as inputs to the importer’s further 
exports. Computing VS1 is more difficult than computing VS. VS can be computing using 
solely the delivery matrix of the reporting country whether VS1 requires matching bilateral 
trade flow data with intermediate delivery matrices for all trading partners. 
To avoid double-counting in the worldwide measure of vertical trade, this paper 
integrates in the definition of vertical trade only the part of VS1 that comes back to the 
country of origin, let us call it VS1*. A typical example is trade between the US and Mexico 
and Canada through “the motor vehicle industry21. In that case, VS1* is defined as the exports 
that are, further down the production chain, re-imported as inputs embedded in their 
consumed imports. This simply means that when the US import cars from Mexico, US made 
19 Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) 
20 Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999). 
21 In Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), the authors give empirical evidence from case studies that the share of 
total trade that is vertical specialization based is larger than VS. 
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motors must be deducted from US imports measured in value added. In our paper, as in Yi 22, 
the total value of value added trade is equal to standard trade minus VS and VS1. 
Our paper’s method is similar to Hummel et alii’s, but we compute VS for many more 
countries in two years: 1997 and 2001. Furthermore, because we use world wide input-output 
tables reconciled with bilateral trade statistics, we can offer a measure of world trade in value-
added. 
2. How to compute trade flows in value added 
2.1. GTAP database 
Computing international trade flows in value added requires the use of input-output tables 
and in particular of intermediate deliveries matrices reconciled with bilateral trade data. The 
first input-output tables had been developed by Leontief in the 1930s and set the foundations 
of the input-output analysis.23 This branch of economics has in turn nourished general 
equilibrium modelling, allowing for the construction of simple computable economic models 
relying on the Leontief inverse matrix.24 Such models make possible the analysis of direct and 
indirect effects of changes in one economic variable on all others. They have also been used 
for the study of international trade, in the more specific context of computable general 
equilibrium models. In this context, they must be reconciled with bilateral trade data. That has 
been done by the GTAP project (Global Trade Analysis Project). 
The project started in 1993 at Purdue University (United States). It associates 24 
international organisation and research centres among which the United Nations, WTO, the 
European Commission, OECD and CEPII. GTAP's goal is to improve the quality of 
                                                
22 Yi (2003), pp. 58-60. 
23 Leontief (1936).  
24 Shoven and Wholley (1992). 
quantitative analysis of global economic issues within an economy-wide framework. It 
provides databases and programmes for computable general equilibrium models. We work 
with versions 5 (for 1997) and 6 (for 2001) of the GTAP database, which covers 57 sectors 
for 66 « regions » in 1997 and 87 « regions » in 2001 (countries or country groups) 
respectively. We work with 66 regions in both years. The database provides final demand and 
input-output tables differentiating domestic and imported intermediate deliveries for each 
region. In each input-output tables, two full intermediate deliveries matrices are available: one 
for domestic inputs and one for imported inputs. It also provides information on bilateral 
international trade by industry. 
Map 1: The 66 regions used in the paper 
 
We have country specific data on grey countries, but only regional data on coloured countries. Countries 
with the same colour belong to the same region. 
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Original data come from national statistical offices, and hence its quality depends on their 
quality25. In spite of standardization efforts, statistical conventions differ among countries and 
some national statistical offices are too understaffed to produce reliable data. Making official 
data compatible with GTAP is also a source of difficulty. Data exclusively on a single 
country, like input-output tables, are less reliable than trade data as they cannot benefit from 
double check with data from partner countries. Moreover, the GTAP team has imposed some 
assumptions in order to reconcile trade data. For example, interpolation of data on transport 
costs was necessary. The GTAP team is conscious of such quality problems. Nevertheless, the 
database has been used by a network of more than 3,500 researchers for longer than a decade. 
The organisation of the GTAP project allows remarks to be systematically registered and 
integrated for the improvement of the database. The GTAP database is therefore a reference 
for experts and researchers in international trade26. In our appraisal of the database, we have 
not found defaults that could systematically bias the exercise we conduct in this paper.  
2.2. Theoretical foundation of the calculation27  
In the context of a closed economy, equilibrium between output and final demand 
requires that output is equal to the sum of intermediate deliveries and of final demand. 
P=A*P + FD 
Where P is a vector of output for each product, FD a vector of final demand for each 
product, A a matrix of input coefficients taken from the intermediate deliveries matrix. It 
consists of elements aij, defined as the amount of product i required for the production of one 
unit of product j. 
25 For example, we have stressed the importance of intra-firm trade. This kind of trade can bias our methodology 
if firms set their transfer prices in order to redirect their profits to countries where the tax burden is lower. 
According to IMF rules transfer prices must correspond to market prices in the country of origin and prices set 
by firms can be modified by customs and the tax authority. Some biases may however persist. 
26 For additional information, refer to http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu 
27 This is extended in Daudin, Rifflart, Schweisguth, and Veroni (2006). 
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As a result, a well known result in input-output analysis links changes in the final demand 
of each product and production:  
P =(I-A)-1*FD 
Where I is the identity matrix. Each output vector P is itself associated with a value added 
vector VA which gives each industry value-added required by the output vector. 
VA=P – diag(P)A’i 
Where diag(P) is the square matrix having the elements of P on its diagonal, A’ is the 
transpose of matrix A and i is the summation vector, a column vector filled by 1s.28 Hence, 
the value added vector VA associated with the final demand vector FD is equal to:
VA =  (I – A)-1∗FD – diag((I – A)-1∗FD)A’i 
This can be extended to the case of a world including many inter-linked open economies. 
The world can be considered as a single economy where each sector in each country produces 
a specific product, which is produced nowhere else. There is an “extended” intermediate 
deliveries matrix G of dimension number of products*number of countries which gives the 
amount of product i from country m required per unit of product j in country n.29 
In the same way, we can write:  
VA = P – diag(P)G’i = (I – G)-1*FD – diag((I – G)-1FD)G’i 
Where VA and P are vectors of dimension number of products*number of countries. This 
formula allows the computation of the value-added production (VA) linked to the 
consumption or investment of some final product (P). Practically, P is taken from trade and 
28 This last relation is easier to understand if one keeps in mind that P-P*A is equal to the vector of total ouput 
not used as inputs for further production : this is not the same thing as value-added. 
29 See Hoen (2002), pp. 51-58 for a discussion of this method. 
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final usage statistics. It allows the computation of VA from which value-added trade values 
are extracted. 
2.3. Some necessary hypotheses 
However, the matrix G is unknown. As far as we know, no statistical institute diffuses 
such details. Data on whether inputs and final use goods are imported or domestic exist in 
GTAP though and can be used to approximate G. This is what Hoen calls the “limited 
information multi-country input-output model”.  
The approximation is obtained, in the input-output tradition, by a fixed-proportion 
assumption. The assumption is that the share of each partner country in imported products is 
the same independent of its use (as a final demand item or as an intermediate consumption). 
This assumption means that the share of Mexico is the same in the imported oil used by U.S. 
households and in the imported oil used as input in U.S. manufacture. 
Data on foreign trade flows also need some price amendments. Imported goods volumes 
are measured by GTAP — for example in the intermediate deliveries tables — in import 
prices. Such prices include production prices, transport costs, insurance costs as well as taxes 
levied on imports. However, to make the link between imports and production in the origin 
country, we must measure volumes of imported goods used as intermediate deliveries or as 
final demand at production prices. To transform import prices into production prices, we 
apply a constant ratio along the different usage of different goods. This is equivalent to 
assuming that that goods originated from the same country and from the same industry bear 
the same transport cost and the same import duties whatever their use in the importing 
country. This is a reasonable assumption. However, because our industry aggregation is not 
very fine it might be the case that composition makes a difference between different use. 
The difference between import values and export – containing transport, maintenance and 
insurance costs and called margin services utilisation in the GTAP database. Ideally, we 
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would like to be able to allocate it to trade flows of the transport industry. However, there is 
no good way of doing that. The database does not indicate whether transport services linked 
to a trade flow were provided by a firm in the importing country, a firm in the exporting 
country or a firm in a third country. The only data available are the share of each country in 
the total supply of transport services linked to total international trade flows. We have 
therefore decided to exclude margin services trade from our computation. 
3. Results 
3.1. Value-added trade in general 
Our data suggest that vertical trade has developed faster that the total world trade 
between 1997 and 2001. The growth of vertical trade was 16% whereas the value added trade 
growth was to just 10%. It contributed to 35% of the increase of total trade. During this 
period, the share of vertical trade in total exports increased from 25,3 % to 26,3 %. Whereas 
“standard” openness rate is 22.6% in 2001, it is only 16.7 % in terms of value-added trade. 
3.1.1. Comparing with previous measures 
Before developing our own results, we compare them with those found by Yi and his 
coauthors30. Our framework is very similar from theirs. We use the same definition of vertical 
trade and compute from input-output tables. The difference, however, is that our database is 
more exhaustive and we can compute the total vertical trade for all countries. 
Yi et alii31 calculated VS (i.e. the share of imported of inputs, including inputs for inputs, 
in exports) for 10 OECD countries and 4 emerging countries, using OECD Inputs-outputs 
                                                
30 Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999), Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001); Yi 
(2003); Chen, Kondratowicz, and Yi (2005). 
31 Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999) tables 2 and 3, Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), pp 84-85.  
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tables. Yi et alii32 in an article published in 2005 extended the calculation to the end of the 
1990s. For comparison purposes, we compute VS using the same method for all the countries 
in our sample: our data cover 1997 and 2001. The results are given in Figure 3. 
Yi et alii. provide VS measures in 1997 for five countries: we can directly compare these 
with our own measures. “Our” VS is the same as theirs for Japan, Netherlands and the United-
States. It is more important in Denmark (28% against 33%) and much less important in the 
United Kingdom (27% versus 21%). There are many possible explanations for the difference. 
The main one is that GTAP Input-Output tables are different from theirs. We also use a 
different industry classification. On the whole, the data do not indicate that we are measuring 
radically different things. 
No same-year comparison is possible for the other OECD countries. Yet, our results are 
similar to theirs. The better integrated OECD countries in international vertical specialisation 
are Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands: imported inputs represent between 25 % and 35 % 
of their exports. The US, Japan and Australia export mainly their local production. The main 
European economies have a vertical specialization share of about 20-25 %. Our data follow 
the increasing vertical specialisation trend in Canada, the United States, Australia and 
Germany since the 1970. They also follow the trend of declining share of vertical trade in 
Japanese exports from 1980. 
Figure 3: Vertical specialization in OECD countries: comparing our results to Yi et alii’s 
32 Chen, Kondratowicz, and Yi (2005), p 42, table 2. 
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Sources: Chen and alii (2005), authors’ calculations based on GTAP data for 1997 and 2001. 
Comparisons for emerging countries (Ireland, Korea, Taiwan and Mexico) are less 
encouraging: “our” VS is quite different from Yi et alii’s. That might be due to differences in 
data quality. Nevertheless, both measures that the share of vertical trade in their exports at a 
higher level then for most OECD countries.  
Yi et alii 33   extrapolate their results to the rest of the world. They find that the share of 
vertical trade in world exports was equal to 22.7% at the end of the 1990s, against 15.9 % 25 
years earlier (a more than 40 % increase). The contribution of vertical specialization trade in 
trade growth in the last 30 years is substantial: one third for France, more than half in Canada, 
the Netherlands and in Asian (Taiwan) or Latin America (Mexico) emerging countries. 
33 Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999), table 5. 
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Computing VS1 (exported intermediates embodied in importing countries exports) for 
1997 and 2001 with the GTAP database gives different results from the method presented in 
Chen et alii. This is probably the results of using a full set of intermediate deliveries matrices. 
VS1* is more interesting (exported intermediates embodied in further imports). We 
measure it as the difference between value-added trade plus VS and standard trade. In Japan, 
VS1* is very small (1.6 % of the total exports in 1997 and 2001). In the US, we have 7.9 % in 
1997 and 9.9 % in 2001. Our results are compatible with Yi and alii34 measure based on the 
US Mexico trade and US Canada auto trade only (8.2 % in 1997 for VS1*). That confirms a 
strong regional integration of the US with its two neighbours, in the framework of free trade 
agreement. 
On the whole, our results are compatible with the ones found by Yi and his successive co-
authors. 
3.1.2. Value-added trade at the country level 
 
Map 2 gives the share of vertical exports in total exports for each country in the word. 
Exports of small countries have a bigger share of imported inputs. Vertical specialisation 
makes up to 40 % of exports in some Asian and European countries. 
                                                
34 Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (1999), Appendice III, p 33, table A2 
Map 2: Share of vertical exports in total exports 
 
 
The ranking of top exporters is not dramatically changed in value added trade. The US 
confirm their first position, increasing their share of world exports (from 13 % to 14 %). 
Japan remains third, but closer to Germany (second) and increasing the gap with China 
(fourth). Then follow France, the UK, Italy and Canada. The biggest “losers” are Belgium, 
moving from the 10th to the 16th position, and Singapore (18th to 32nd). Among the “winners”, 
the former soviet union moves up 4 places (17th to 13th), while Mexico an Spain move to the 
front of South Korea.  
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Table 1: 20 top exporters with standard and value added trade measures (exports as a 
share of total world exports in 2001) 
 Standard Value added  
 Share of world exports in % Rank 
Share of world 
exports in % Rank 
Change in 
share 
United States 13.0 1 14.0 1 +7.5% 
Germany 8.9 2 8.8 2 -1.0% 
Japan 6.6 3 7.9 3 +19.1% 
China 5.6 4 5.9 4 +6.5% 
France 5.0 5 5.2 5 +3.6% 
United Kingdom 4.9 6 5.2 6 +5.7% 
Italy 4.1 7 4.0 7 -2.1% 
Canada 3.9 8 3.6 8 -7.4% 
rest of Middle East 2.9 9 3.2 9 +11.1% 
Belgium 2.6 10 1.6 16 -37.6% 
South Korea 2.6 11 2.3 12 -13.1% 
Mexico 2.4 12 2.5 10 +3.0% 
Spain 2.3 13 2.3 11 -0.9% 
Netherlands 2.2 14 1.9 14 -13.2% 
Taiwan 2.0 15 1.7 15 -15.1% 
Malaysia 1.8 16 1.5 18 -21.0% 
former Soviet Union 1.8 17 2.1 13 18.2% 
Singapore 1.6 18 0.7 32 -54.7% 
Switzerland 1.6 19 1.6 17 +1.4% 
Hong Kong 1.4 20 1.4 19 +1.1% 
Note: Trade from Hong Kong and the Netherlands is already modified in the GTAP database to re-allocate re-
exports.35 
3.1.3. Industrial classification 
Industrial shares are deeply modified in value-added trade. Remember that we reallocate 
exports according to the sector of origin of their inputs. That means that a number of mainly 
“non-tradable” sectors that are being used as inputs to the production of “tradable” goods 
increase their trade share. 
Figure 4 illustrates this transfer from industry to the agriculture, raw materials and 
services. The trade in industrial goods is much more important when measured in standard 
term (75 % of total trade in 2001) than when it measured in value added term (52.5 % of total 
trade). At the opposite, the trade in primary sector and above all, in the services sector tend to 
increase when we proceed with the value added measure. The share of services drastically 
                                                
35 Gehlhar (2006). 
increases from 17 % to 37 % of total trade. The primary sector (including agriculture and 
extraction processes) also increases when measured in value added: 7.5 % to 10 %.  
Figure 4: Share of different sectors in standard trade and value-added trad 
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Table 2 shows the largest increase in trade share when one looks at value-added trade. 
Among agricultural sectors, the share of sugar cane or sugar beet is multiplied by 76, and that 
of raw milk by 68! These are extreme examples of commodities quasi exclusively traded as 
inputs in manufactured food products (sugar and dairy products respectively). The share of 
utilities increased as well: water is multiplied by 12, electricity by 8 and gas by 6, reflecting 
their role as inputs for the production of manufactured goods. This is also the case of services. 
The trade share of financial services is multiplied by 4, and that of trade, communication, 
recreational and other services multiplied by 3. Business services becomes the main sector in 
world trade (10 % of value added trade), before machinery and equipment.  
Table 3 shows that many manufactured goods see their share largely reduced. The share 
of motor vehicles and parts is divided by 2.3, as there is a lot of “double counting” in this 
category. The same is true for petroleum and coal products, electronic equipment and many 
food products. 
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Table 2: Sectors with share increasing the most in value added 
 Standard Value added  
 
Share of 
total rank 
Share of 
total rank ratio 
sugar cane, sugar beet 0.0 54 0.1 54 75.7 
raw milk 0.0 53 0.2 47 67.7 
water 0.0 52 0.3 38 11.8 
electricity 0.3 36 2.6 12 8.0 
gas manufacture, distribution 0.0 50 0.2 41 6.5 
financial services nec 0.8 24 3.3 10 4.2 
paddy rice 0.0 51 0.1 51 4.2 
forestry 0.1 43 0.5 34 3.6 
trade 2.6 11 8.4 3 3.2 
communication 0.6 29 1.8 18 3.0 
recreational and other services 1.2 23 3.5 7 2.9 
bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses 0.1 47 0.2 43 2.6 
construction 0.4 34 1.0 25 2.4 
fishing 0.1 46 0.2 44 2.0 
business services nec 5.3 5 10.2 1 1.9 
public admin. and defence, education, health 1.6 20 2.9 11 1.9 
Ratio = share of total in value added / share of total in standard trade 
 
Table 3: Sectors with share decreasing the most in value added 
 Standard Value added  
 
Share of 
total rank 
Share of 
total rank ratio 
petroleum, coal products 1.5 21 0.6 33 2.5 
motor vehicles and parts 7.7 4 3.3 9 2.3 
meat products 0.5 32 0.2 46 2.3 
processed rice 0.1 48 0.0 55 2.1 
bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat products 0.3 35 0.2 50 2.1 
dairy products 0.4 33 0.2 45 2.0 
electronic equipment 12.0 2 6.0 6 2.0 
leather products 1.3 22 0.7 31 2.0 
wearing apparel 2.3 12 1.2 22 1.8 
transport equipment nec 3.0 8 1.7 19 1.7 
food products nec 1.9 16 1.1 24 1.7 
metals nec 2.2 13 1.4 21 1.6 
machinery and equipment nec 14.8 1 9.2 2 1.6 
wood products 1.8 18 1.2 23 1.5 
manufactures nec 2.7 10 1.9 17 1.4 
textiles 2.8 9 2.2 15 1.3 
vegetable oils and fats 0.2 40 0.2 48 1.3 
chemical, rubber, plastic products 10.2 3 8.0 4 1.3 
Ratio = share of total in standard trade / share of total in value added 
As a result, the number manufacturing sectors belonging to the largest ten shares declines 
from 7 to 4 in value-added trade (see Table 4). The farm industry sector, the textile and the 
wood and paper which represents both about 5 % of the total trade loose between 0.3 and 2.3 
percentage points. But the absolute change are much more important in other sectors. The 
trade share of electronics and other manufactures sector decreases from 29.5 % to 17.1%, the 
trade share of the chemical sector decreases from 17.5% to 13.5% and the trade share of the 
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metal and transport products sector decreases from 12.6% to 7.4%. This indicates that vertical 
trade is very important in these industries, confirming the results of Yi and their co-authors. 
As expected, the “implied” vertical share trade in these sectors’ exports is larger with our 
method than theirs. This is because we re-allocate part of their exports to other domestic 
sectors, notably inputs, whereas they only remove imported inputs. 
Table 4: Export shares of the 10 industries in standard world exports and value-added 
word exports in 2001 (out of 55 sectors)  
Standard trade Value-added trade 
machinery and equipment nec 14.8% business services nec 10.2% 
electronic equipment 12.0% machinery and equipment nec 9.2% 
chemical, rubber, plastic products 10.2% trade 8.4% 
motor vehicles and parts 7.7% chemical, rubber, plastic products 8.0% 
business services nec 5.3% transport 6.2% 
transport 4.7% electronic equipment 6.0% 
oil 3.3% recreational and other services 3.5% 
transport equipment nec 3.0% oil 3.4% 
textiles 2.8% motor vehicles and parts 3.3% 
manufactures nec 2.7% financial services nec 3.3% 
3.2. What role for vertical trade in regionalization ? 
The development of world trade has in some regions been concomitant with the 
intensification of regionalization. To what extend did the fragmentation of production 
processes contribute to regionalization? Table 5 shows the various degrees of regionalization 
in Europe, the euro area, East Asia, America (North and South) and Austral Africa, measured 
as the share of intra-regional to total exports (line 2). According to this indicator, the most 
regionalized trade is Europe’s (61%) and the least regionalized is Austral Africa’s (10%). 
However, this indicator is very sensitive to the size of the regions (first line of Table 5), the 
distance between trading partners and the size of the constituent countries, and therefore 
cannot be easily interpreted as a measure of the intensity of regionalization. In North 
America, regional trade would greater if the US were split into fifty or less states. Still, it is 
interesting to compare the degree of regionalization for vertical and value added trade (line 3 
and 4). The share of intra-regional trade is much higher in vertical trade than in value added. 
Comment [GD1]: Ces chiffres ne sont pas les 
mêmes que ceux de la table 2 : quesako ? 
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For example, 65% of East Asian vertical exports are sent off to other East Asian countries, 
while only 30% of value added exports are. 
Table 5 : The extent of regionalization and relative size of the regions, 2001 
In  % Europe36 Euro area East Asia37 North America38
South 
America 
Austral 
Africa39
Total exports as a share of world 
exports  40% 28% 25% 20% 3% 1% 
Share of regional exports in total 
exports  61% 41% 40% 45% 19% 10% 
Share of regional exports in 
vertical export 78% 53% 65% 68% 34% 22% 
Share of regional exports in 
value-added exports   54% 36% 30% 38% 16% 8% 
Share of vertical exports in total 
exports  30% 31% 28% 24% 15% 18% 
Share of vertical exports in 
regional exports  38% 39% 46% 36% 28% 40% 
 
The share of vertical exports in regional or total exports is a good comparative indicator 
of the intensity of vertical specialisation, as it does not depend directly on the relative size of 
the region. Not surprisingly, the share of vertical trade is much higher in intra-regional trade 
(line 6) trade than in total trade (line 5). Production processes integration is more intense 
between geographically close countries, or countries in a free trade area. East Asia is the 
region where the share of vertical trade in regional exports is the highest: 46%. This confirms 
the traditional literature on East Asian (see supra). The degree of dependence of East Asia on 
this form of regional integration is larger than for North America (36%) and Europe (38%).  
Table 6 looks at the evolution of the degree of regionalization and the intensity of vertical 
trade between 1997 and 2001. Line 5 confirms the relative increase of vertical trade, but not at 
the same speed in all regions. Some regions have seen their share of vertical trade increase 
very fast in four years: East Asia (+7.2%), Austral Africa (+18%) and South America (+25%), 
                                                
36 Including the European Union at 25 (except the Baltic States), Switzerland, the rest of European Free Trade 
Area. 
37 Including China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thaïland , 
Taïwan and Vietnam. 
38 Including the United States, Canada, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean 
39 Including Botswana, the rest of South African Custom Union (Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland), Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Angola and Mauritius 
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while Europe has been fairly stable (+1.8%). In East Asia, vertical trade has risen by 24 % 
compared to 12.5 % for value added trade, and contributed to 40 % of total export growth 
over the period. The share of vertical trade in East Asian exports (28.2 %) is slightly higher 
than the world average (26.3 %) in 2001.  
Table 6: The evolution of vertical trade and regionalization 
 Europe Euro area East Asia North America 
South 
America 
Austral 
Africa 
Growth of the share of regional 
trade in total exports (1997-2001) -0.7% -3.3% -0.1% +10% -22% +8.5% 
Growth of the share of regional 
trade in vertical exports (1997-2001) -1.5% -5.6% +3.2% +3.1% -16% +8% 
Growth of the share of regional 
trade in value added exports (1997-
2001) 
-0.6% -2% -5.3% +12.5% -26% +2.2% 
Growth of the share of vertical trade 
in regional exports (1997-2001) +1% -1.2% +11% -0.9% +34% +17% 
Growth of the share of vertical trade 
in total exports (1997-2001) +1.8% +1.3% +7.2% +5.8% +25% +18% 
 
Table 6 also compares the evolution of the share of regional exports from 1997 to 2001 
and gives some indication of whether relative regional integration has been deepening or not 
(line 1). Standard trade indicates that regional integration has been stable in Asia and Europe, 
decreasing in South America and increasing in North America and Austral Africa. Value-
added trade suggest suggests that regionalization has decreased in East Asia and in South 
America and increased in North America (line 3). East Asia and South America has become 
more and more dependent on external consumption. In East Asia, intra-regional vertical trade 
has grown much faster (28 %) than value added trade (6.7 %) between 1997 and 2001, 
contributing to 75 % of the increase in intra-regional trade over the period. The intra-regional 
export share measured in value added has declined from 32.1 % to 30.4 % between 1997 and 
2001, even if the degree of dependence on intra-regional imports has increased: intra-regional 
imports accounted for 48 % of total imports in 2001 compared to 43.7 % in 1997. 
Examining value-added trade shows that apparent regionalization does not challenge the 
fact that the East Asian model of development is very much dependent on external markets. 
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Europe is in an intermediate situation: a fair share of its regional trade is linked to production 
fragmentation, but this is not growing. 
3.3. How is production organised between East Asian countries? 
The analysis of vertical trade flows helps understanding the patterns of production within 
East Asia. The first thing to notice is that bilateral trade balances can be misleading. Table 7 
shows the bilateral trade balances of some Asian countries for standard and value added trade. 
If the overall balance of a country is unchanged by the calculation, bilateral trade balances can 
vary substantially. In China, which was in 2001 the main assembly base, the trade surplus 
with the US is reduced by more than 10% when measured in value added. At the same time, 
Chinese trade deficit with Korea and Taiwan is divided by half, as most of China’s imports 
from Korea and Taiwan are used as intermediary products for final exports to the US. Korea 
and Taiwan both show a big surplus towards China and the US and a big deficit with Japan in 
standard trade. We find that for both countries two thirds of the deficit with Japan is only 
vertical trade, not intended for final consumption within the country. On the other side, the 
trade surplus towards China also shrinks dramatically, as most Taiwanese or Korean goods 
imported by China are not consumed there. 
Table 7: Bilateral trade balances (in million $) 
Standard trade China Japan Korea Taiwan US 
China 0 -8 694 13 339 11 148 -78 033 
Japan 8 694 0 -10 853 -11 130 -52 888 
Korea -13 339 10 853 0 -2 904 -8 107 
Taiwan -11 148 11 130 2 904 0 -14 404 
Value added trade China Japan Korea Taiwan US 
China 0 -11 097 4 307 4 658 -66 153 
Japan 11 097 0 -3 636 -5 088 -65 098 
Korea -4 307 3 636 0 -255 -11 270 
Taiwan -4 658 5 088 255 0 -13 317 
To check if these remarks can be extended to other groups of countries, we compare the 
variance of intra-regional trade imbalances in Table 8. It shows that the variance of bilateral 
intra-regional trade imbalances is always smaller for value-added trade than for standard 
trade, suggesting that a fair share of regional trade disequilibria is linked to production 
fragmentation. 
Table 8: Variance of bilateral intra-regional trade imbalances 
 East Asia America Europe Austral Africa 
Ratio between the variance of intra-
regional bilateral trade imbalances 
in value-added trade and in 
standard trade (2001) 
42% 64% 45% 35% 
3.4. Industrial repartition of trade 
Standard trade statistics suggests that in 2004, both East Asia and Europe had similar 
global revealed comparative advantages. This assessment might not be true in value-added 
trade, as the importance of service trade imbedded in industrial trade is taken into account. 
To check whether this is the case or not, we use the revealed comparative advantage 
index of the CEPII which is defined as follows.40 
= 1000
Xi + Mi
Scaling factor: total trade
of country i
1 24 34
• Xik − Mik( )
Trade balance of country i
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RCAik
When this index is equal to zero, there are no comparative advantage : the trade deficit in 
this product could be simply computed from the total trade deficit and the share of the product 
in national trade. Higher than zero means a comparative advantage, lower than zero means a 
comparative disadvantage. Table 10 gives indices both for the total trade of a region 
(including intra-regional trade) and for extra-regional trade. The first group of indices should 
be interpreted as giving the mean comparative advantage of different countries in each region, 
weighted by exports. The second group of indices should be interpreted as giving the 
comparative advantage of the region as a whole. 
                                                
40 This is for example used in Arthus and Fontagné (2006). 
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Africa and South America both have typical primary producers profiles. North America 
only has a comparative advantage in service production. It is interesting to notice, however, 
that the East Asian comparative advantage is more specific when examined in value-added 
trade than when examined in standard trade. Standard trade suggests that both Europe and 
East Asia have a comparative advantage in industrial production. Value added suggests that, 
actually, Europe also has a comparative advantage in service production, whereas East Asia 
comparative advantage is only in industrial production.  
Table 9: Revealed comparative advantages 
  East Asia Europe North America South America Austral Africa 
Total standard 
trade 
Primary -38 -17 -2 86 79 
Secondary 55 19 -29 -65 -39 
Tertiary -17 -2 31 -21 -40 
Total VA trade 
Primary -26 -22 -13 115 70 
Secondary 53 11 -17 -70 -16 
Tertiary -27 11 29 -45 -54 
Extra-regional 
standard trade 
Primary -71 -46 -5 105 88 
Secondary 109 54 -63 -79 -40 
Tertiary -38 -8 68 -26 -48 
Extra-regional 
VA trade 
Primary -40 -50 -20 115 77 
Secondary 86 26 -33 -70 -15 
Tertiary -47 24 54 -45 -61 
 
Table 10 confirms this specificity of East Asia by looking at the correlation of the 
revealed comparative advantages for 55 sectors according to VA trade, weighted by the share 
of each sector in inter-regional trade.  
Table 10: Weighted correlations of revealed comparative advantages, VA trade, 55 
sectors 
 Austral Africa South America North America East Asia Europe 
Austral Africa 1     
South 
America 0.61 1    
North 
America -0.57 -0.40 1   
East Asia -0.11 -0.49 -0.26 1  
Europe -0.47 -0.52 0.17 -0.06 1 
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Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the very important debate concerning the new dynamism of the 
international trade. Since the beginning of the 1990s, growing international trade is tied to a 
change in the content of traded goods linked to the development of a new production process 
based on a new international division of labour. In this context, it appears more and more 
difficult to understand trade with standard statistics. It would be very useful to understand the 
international production process enough to be able to answer the question “who produces 
what and for whom?”. That should be done by reallocating the value added contained in trade 
in final goods to each country participating to its production. We do this using the GTAP 
database for 1997 and 2001. 
This approach allows us to examine a number of admitted facts about trade observed in 
the standard data. We focus on the regionalization process and the role of Asia in the 
expansion of total trade. Like Yi and his co-authors, we show the tight relation between the 
growth of world trade and the development of vertical trade. Between 1997 and 2001, the 
growth of vertical trade was 16% while the value added trade was just to 10%. The share of 
vertical trade in the total trade increases from 25.3% to 26.3%. 
This move is not uniform in all regions. The integration of production processes is more 
intense between geographically close countries, or countries in a free trade area, than with the 
rest of the world. Vertical trade plays a particularly important role for the regional integration 
of Europe and East Asia. In these two regions, the share of intra regional trade is much higher 
in vertical trade than in value added trade. 65% of East Asian vertical exports are sent off to 
other East Asian countries, while only 30% of its value added exports are. Hence, East Asia 
still relies more heavily on extra-regional final markets for its production than North America 
and Europe. Regional trade imbalances in East Asia are actually much smaller when they are 
measured in terms of value-added. 
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Another striking aspect of our results is that manufactures are much less dominant in 
value-added trade than in standard trade. Apparently non-tradable inputs are often consumed 
in foreign markets after having been embedded in manufacture exports. This form of service 
exports is especially important for Europe and North America. Taking this into account shows 
that East Asia’s revealed comparative advantage is only in industrial trade, whereas Europe’s 
comparative advantage is both in industrial and service trade. 
An obvious limitation of our work is that our latest data are only for 2001. Even if this is 
more recent that what was previously available, it is still too old to offer guidance on the most 
recent evolutions of world trade. 2001 was a very depressed year for world trade, and the role 
of China has since dramatically increased. We are waiting for the release of the version 7 of 
GTAP database to apply our method to 2004, making the analysis slightly more topical. More 
fundamentally, we hope both that our method will encourage the necessary data gathering to 
produce these data more quickly. We also hope that some of the qualitative results are still 
useful for anyone thinking about trade globalization: services are more important than they 
seem to be, regionalization can take different forms… 
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